Markov games are a model of multiagent environments that are convenient for studying multiagent reinforcement learning. This paper describes a set of reinforcement-learning algorithms based on estimating value functions and presents convergence theorems for these algorithms. The main contribution of this paper is that it presents the convergence theorems in a way that makes it easy to reason about the behavior of simultaneous learners in a shared environment.
Introduction
building a value function -a mapping from state to expected reward. Several authors have applied valueGame theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, function reinforcement learning to Markov games to 1947) provides a powerful set of conceptual tools for create agents that learn from experience how to best reasoning about behavior in multiagent environinteract with other agents. This paper presents severments. Markov games (van der Wal, 1981) , or al value-function reinforcement-learning algorithms stochastic games (Owen, 1982; Shapley, 1953) , are a and what is known about how they behave when formalization of temporally extended agent interlearning simultaneously in different types of games. action.
Section 2 describes single-agent environments and Reinforcement learning (Kaelbling, Littman & the basic Q-learning algorithm, which converges to Moore, 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998) is the problem an optimal value function and optimal behavior in of an agent learning to behave from experience. One this type of environment. Section 3 examines multiwell studied approach to reinforcement learning is agent environments and the Nash Q-learning algorithm. Section 4 looks at one situation in which Nash Q-learning converges -when there are adversarial E-mail address: mlittman@research.att.com (M.L. Littman).
equilibria; Section 5 examines another -when there are coordination equilibria. Section 6 presents some discounted rewards is also bounded. From an appliconcluding thoughts.
cations perspective, the discount factor can be thought of as the probability that the agent will be allowed to continue gathering reward after the 2. Single-agent environments current step, or, from an economic perspective, as an inverse interest rate on reward (Puterman, 1994) . Markov decision processes (MDPs) (Bellman, A policy is a description of the behavior of an 1957; Howard, 1960 ) are a descriptive model of agent. A stationary policy, p:6 → P(! ), specifies, single-agent environments. In the MDP framework, for each state, a probability distribution over actions it is assumed that, although there may be a great deal to be taken. Notationally, p(s, a) is the probability of uncertainty about the effects of an agent's actions, assigned to action a in state s. A deterministic policy there is never any uncertainty about the agent's is one that assigns probability 1 to some action in current state -it has complete and perfect perceptueach state. Every MDP has a deterministic stationary al abilities.
optimal policy (Bertsekas, 1987) . A policy p for an agent can be evaluated by 2.1. Markov decision processes computing the long-run value the agent can expect to p gain. Let Q (s, a) be the expected discounted future Mathematically, a Markov decision process is a reward to the agent for starting in state s and tuple k6, !, T, R, bl, where executing action a for one step, then continuing according to policy p. This can be defined by a set • 6 is a finite set of states of the environment;
of simultaneous linear equations, one for each state • ! is a finite set of actions available to the agent; s: (1960) showed that there exists a stationary deexpected reward for taking action a in state s); terministic policy p* that is optimal for every and starting state. The Q-function for this policy, written • 0 # b , 1 is a discount factor. Q*, is defined by the set of equations This paper considers only models with finite state
and action spaces.
a9 [! s 9[6 In an MDP, agents should act in such a way as to (1) maximize some measure of their long-run reward received. Under the discounted objective, which is and the greedy policy that assigns probability one to the focus of this paper, the discount factor 0 # b , 1 action argmax Q*(s, a) in state s is optimal a controls how much effect future rewards have on the (Puterman, 1994) . decisions at each moment, with small values of b
The presence of the maximization operator in Eq. emphasizing near-term gain and larger values giving (1) means the system of equations is not linear. significant weight to later situations. Concretely, a Methods such as value iteration, policy iteration, t reward of r received t steps in the future is worth b r linear programming, and modified policy iteration to the agent now. Mathematically, the discount factor can be used to solve the equations (Puterman, 1994) . has the desirable property that if all immediate Barto, Sutton and Watkins (1989) The next section describes a reinforcement-learning s9)max Q[s9, a9] . In a noise-free environment, this a9 algorithm with guaranteed performance in MDP value would be directly assigned to Q [s, a] . Howenvironments.
ever, to get an accurate estimate, we need to average together many independent samples. The learning rate a blends our present estimate with our previous 2.2. Q-learning estimates to produce a best guess at Q*(s, a); it needs to be decreased slowly for the estimated Q-Q-learning (Watkins, 1989; Watkins & Dayan, function to converge to Q* (Jaakkola, Jordan & 1992) can be viewed as a sampled, asynchronousŚ ingh, 1994; Szepesvari & Littmann, 1999 ; Tsitsikmethod for estimating the optimal Q-function for an lis, 1994; Watkins & Dayan, 1992) . unknown MDP. Q-learning is a temporal-difference
The greedy policy, which assigns probability one learning method (Sutton, 1988) may not explore a sufficient amount to guarantee new information into its prior experience according optimal performance. So, the basic Q-learning algoto a learning rate 0 , a , 1.
rithm identifies optimal behavior, but cannot adopt it. The Q-function is an ideal data structure forŚ ingh, Jaakkola, Littman and Szepesvari (2000) reinforcement learning. There are three fundamental show that the conflict between learning the optimal functions in algorithms for solving MDPs: the value policy and executing the optimal policy can be function V mapping state to value, the Q-function Q overcome by selecting actions that are greedy in the mapping state and action to value, and the policy p limit with infinite exploration (GLIE). A concrete mapping state to a probability distribution over example of a GLIE policy is decaying e-greedy actions. Given a model in the form of transition and exploration. Let n(s) be the number of times state s reward functions, any of the mappings can be has been encountered so far during learning. Let computed from any one of the others. Without access e(s) 5 c /n(s) for 0 , c , 1. Now, if the agent selects to T and R, however, only the Q-function can be the greedy action in state s with probability 1 2 e(s) used to reconstruct the other two: V(s) 5 max Q(s, a and a random 'exploratory' action in state s with a) and p(s, a) 5 1 if a 5 argmax Q(s, a9), and 0 a9 probability e(s), the rewards obtained by the learner otherwise. In addition, the Q-function is not difficult will converge to optimal. to estimate from experience.
An agent converges in behavior if its action The experience available to a reinforcement-learndistribution becomes stationary (fixed) in the limit. A ing agent in an MDP environment can be summa-GLIE policy need not converge in behavior, since rized by a sequence of experience tuples ks, a, r, s9l.
ties in greedy actions are broken arbitrarily. HowAn experience tuple is a snapshot of a single ever, if there is a unique optimal policy and the transition: the agent starts in state s, takes action a, Q-function converges, a Q-learning agent will conreceives reward r and ends up in state s9.
verge in behavior as well. Convergence in behavior Given an experience tuple ks, a, r, s9l, the Qis important in multi-agent settings, since an agent's learning rule is optimal policy may depend on how other agents Q [s, a] 
behavior with probability one.
In the Markov decision process model, a decision-
n n i 1 n making agent interacts with its environment, represented as a probabilistic transition function. In this Here, Q-functions are defined over joint actions for view, secondary agents must be fixed in their beeach of the agents. Each agent receives rewards havior. The framework of Markov games admits a according to its reward function, with transitions wider view that includes multiple adaptive agents dependent on the actions chosen jointly by the set of with interacting or competing goals.
agents.
With respect to the same set of stationary policies, 3.1. Markov games we can also define the best-response Q-function for each agent i:
• 6 is a finite set of states of the environment;
? max environment -an MDP. the update rule from Q-learning (Eq. (2)) is to use p the Nash equilibrium value in place of the max to p (s, a )Q (s, a , . . . , a ) .
At a Nash equilibrium, each agent is maximizing its
reward given that all other agents remain fixed. 1 a r 1 bVal (s, Q , . . . , Q ) , and Vrieze (1997) show that every Markov game has a Nash equilibrium in stationary policies.
given an experience tuple ks, a , . . . , a , r , . . . , r , 1 n 1 n However, in contrast to MDPs, these policies are s9l. This update rule is due to Hu and Wellman stochastic, in general. A classic example is 'Rock, (1998). Paper, Scissors', in which any deterministic policy This learning algorithm is not known to converge can be consistently defeated, whereas the optimal in general, even if there is a unique value of the stochastic policy always breaks even.
game. Some conditions to guarantee convergence are given in the next two sections. Note, however, that Theorem 3. In a multiagent environment, an agent Hu (1999) and Hu and Wellman (2000) found that following the Nash Q-learning update rule will the rule sometimes converged in simulations even converge to the optimal Q-function with probability when the strict assumptions needed to guarantee one as long as all Q-functions encountered have convergence were not satisfied.
adversarial equilibria and these are used in the update rule. Furthermore, if the agent follows a GLIE policy and the limit equilibrium is unique, it will converge in behavior with probability one.
Adversarial equilibria
For convergence to the game's optimal Q-function, Markov games can have a wide variety of reward all combinations of actions must be executed infinitestructures and learning algorithms can display differly often. In a sense, this puts a restriction on the ent dynamics depending on this structure. This behavior of the other agents in the environment. In section examines payoff structures that, to some general, the learning algorithm converges to the degree, are in conflict with each other.
optimal Q-function for the game defined by the set Define an adversarial equilibrium in an n-player of actions that are executed infinitely often in game as one that is a saddle point. This means that if combination with all other actions. one agent deviates from the equilibrium, it not only Theorem 3 is interesting, but hard to apply in hurts the agent, but it helps all other agents. More general. The condition that all Q-functions encounformally, let p , p , etc. be policies in equilibrium. Minimax Q-learning is a value-function reinThe notion of a Nash equilibrium takes on special forcement-learning algorithm specifically designed meaning in zero-sum games: each policy is evaluated for zero-sum games. It is described in an earlier with respect to the opposing policy that makes it paper (Littman, 1994) , which includes empirical look the worst. This performance measure prefers results on a simple zero-sum Markov game version conservative strategies that can force any opponent of soccer. Other researchers have carried out similar to a stalemate over more daring ones that accrue a studies (Uther & Veloso, 1997) . great deal of reward against some opponents and lose
Note that the definition of the value of a game can a great deal to others. This is the essence of be simplified in the zero-sum case as: minimax: behave so as to maximize your reward in Val (s, Q ) 5 1 1 the worst case. Zero-sum Markov games were first studied by max
Shapley (1953), who showed that each such game
has a unique value function and gave an algorithm This equation identifies the probability distribution that converges to this value function. Thus, even that maximizes the expected value in the face of the though zero-sum Markov games are a strict generaliworst-possible action choice of the opponent. This zation of MDPs, they predate MDPs by several calculation can be carried out via a small linear years.
program. Note that the min can also be defined over Because every reward received by agent 1 in a stochastic policies, but, since it is 'inside' the max, zero-sum game is received with a sign flip by agent the minimum is achieved for a deterministic action 2, we have that Q 5 2 Q ; therefore, only one 2 1
choice. Q-function needs to be learned. Therefore, the Nash Using this revised definition of game value, the equilibrium conditions (Eq. (4)) can be written update rule for minimax Q-learning can be written: simply as:
The convergence of this approach follows from a , a 1 2 the convergence of the generalized Q-learning algo-ŕ ithm (Littman & Szepesvari, 1996; Szepesvari & and Littman, 1999) as well as the results in Section 3.2. 
learning update rule will converge to the optimal a , a 1 2 Q-function with probability one. Furthermore, if the agent follows a GLIE policy and the limit equilibNote that these instantly satisfy the conditions for rium is unique, it will converge in behavior with being an adversarial equilibrium (Eq. (5)).
probability one. The preceding facts imply that if we apply Nash Q-learning to a zero-sum game, all Q-functions encountered during learning will have adversarial
The special structure of zero-sum games makes it equilibria. Thus, Theorem 3 applies and convergence possible to provide several additional guarantees is guaranteed. The next section explains how to about minimax Q-learning. Even if the limit equilibsimplify the Nash Q-learning algorithm in the conrium is not unique, a minimax Q-learning agent with text of zero-sum games.
a GLIE policy in a zero-sum Markov game con-verges to a policy that always achieves at least its
optimal value regardless of its opponent. So, the policy learned by a minimax Q-learning agent is safe
in that it can be executed in total ignorance of its opponent and still exhibit its intended effects. for all 1 # i # n and states s. One observation is that Note that adversarial equilibrium policies in generif a game has a coordination equilibrium, it has a al achieve their learned value (or more) regardless of deterministic coordination equilibrium. This follows the opponent's action. The policy used in the from the fact that the value for each agent is a minimax Q-learning update rule has a stronger convex combination of the values in the Q-functions. guarantee -that it achieves the largest value One consequence of a game possessing a coordipossible in the absence of knowledge of the opponation equilibrium is that no agent has any incentive nent's policy. This suggests that, even in a non-zeroto switch because no other set of policies could result sum game with adversarial equilibria, minimax Qin a higher score. In a sense, what is best for one learning is preferable to Nash Q-learning -if the agent is also best for the others. agent ignores the opponent's payoffs and assumes it
The following theorem is a consequence of the is in a zero-sum game, it will do no worse, and results of Hu and Wellman (1998) and Bowling possibly better, in terms of expected reward.
(2000). In spite of its strong asymptotic guarantees, minimax Q-learning can be slow to learn. Uther and Theorem 5. In a multiagent environment, an agent Veloso (1997) argue that single-agent Q-learning is a following the Nash Q-learning update rule will sensible alternative in zero-sum games because it converge to the optimal Q-function with probability appears to learn more quickly. However, because one as long as all Q-functions encountered have Q-learning's update and action selection are decoordination equilibria and these are used in the terministic, it can be 'tricked' into playing suboptiupdate rule. Furthermore, if the agent follows a mally. Consider the behavior of Q-learning in the GLIE policy and the limit equilibrium is unique, it game 'Rock, Paper, Scissors'. An opponent algowill converge in behavior with probability one. rithm could be written that simulates the updates performed by Q-learning and always selects the Like Theorem 3, this theorem is hard to apply optimal response to what Q-learning is about to because the conditions are difficult to verify in choose. Thus, Q-learning will score considerably advance. The next section addresses a special case in worse than minimax Q-learning (21 at every stage which the conditions are easily verifiable -team as opposed to an average score of 0 for minimax games.
Q-learning).
The next section examines the behavior of Nash 5. This section examines payoff structures that make maximize together. Team games can also be called it so that the agents, to some degree, are working coordination games or fully cooperative games for toward a common goal.
this reason. Boutilier (1996) refers to team Markov Define a coordination equilibrium in an n-player games as multiagent decision processes, since, acting game as one for which all agents achieve their together, the group of agents is faced with an MDP. maximum possible payoff. i games is finding a robust and general way of The above facts imply that if we apply Nash selecting an equilibrium when there are multiple Q-learning to a team game, all Q-functions encoordination equilibria. Boutilier (1996) argues for countered during learning will have coordination establishing a tie-breaking scheme (e.g. lexicogequilibria. Thus, Theorem 5 applies and convergence raphic ordering) to pick the equilibrium to play. is guaranteed. The next section explains how to However, in the presence of noise, there is no simplify the Nash Q-learning algorithm in the conguarantee there will ever be ties and the learners text of team games.
could perceive different unique equilibria and therefore not converge on optimal play.
Team Q-learning
Team Q-learning is a value-function reinforcement-learning algorithm specifically designed 6. Conclusions for team games. The definition of the value of a game can be simplified in the team case as:
This section explores some of the implications of the results described in the paper. Using this revised definition of game value, the The theorems described above can be used to update rule for team Q-learning can be written:
reason about the dynamics of simultaneously learning agents.
It follows from Theorem 4 that two independent 1 a r 1 bVal (s, Q ) .
s d
minimax Q-learning agents will learn Q-functions
that converge. In a zero-sum Markov game, the This update is slightly different from the jointresulting behavior will be optimal for both agents action learner (JAL) algorithm of Claus and Boutilier (mutual best responses). This follows from the fact (1998), since it doesn't use an opponent model. that equilibria in zero-sum games are 'interchangeThe convergence of this approach follows from able'. In other environments, even with more than the convergence of the generalized Q-learning algotwo agents, all minimax Q-learners behave in a waýŕ ithm (Littman & Szepesvari, 1996; Szepesvari & that maximizes their reward given no assumption Littman, 1999) as well as the results in Section 3.2.
whatsoever about the behavior of the other agents. In a zero-sum Markov game between a minimax Theorem 6. In a multiagent environment where Q-learner and a Q-learner, the Q-learner will conagents have identical reward functions, an agent verge to optimal behavior (Theorem 2) if the equilibfollowing the team Q-learning update rule will rium is unique. converge to the optimal Q-function with probability
In a sense, team Markov games are harder. A set one. Furthermore, if the agent follows a GLIE policy of team Q-learners will converge to optimal play if and the limit equilibrium is unique, it will converge the limit Q-functions have a unique maximum for in behavior with probability one. each state. If not, even though all agents will converge on an equilibrium, if they converge on Note that this algorithm learns precisely the same different equilibria, they can score arbitrarily poorly. This is also true of a Q-learner among team Qindicates that more theoretical work on Nash Qlearners.
learning could be quite beneficial. Claus and Boutilier (1998) examined simultaneous Q-learners in team games. They argue that two such 6.3. Policy modeling learners converge to a Nash pair, although it need not be the optimal one. As far as I know, no formal As is evident from the theorems cited in this proof has been presented. Nonetheless, Sen et al.
paper, multiagent environments with multiple (1994), Mundhe and Sen (2000) and others have equilibria pose difficult problems for the conversuccessfully applied this technique to particular gence of learning algorithms. As Bowling and Velgames, validating it as a reasonable approach.
oso (2000) point out, if a game has multiple equilibIn general games, if a Nash Q-learner's behavior ria, the optimal policy must depend on the policies of converges, a Q-learner will learn a best response. the other agents. In this type of environment, opHowever, as in the case with two team Q-learners, ponent-independent algorithms like Nash Q-learning, two Nash Q-learners need not converge to compatminimax Q-learning, and team Q-learning are not ible equilibria and can score arbitrarily badly. A sufficient to identify optimal behavior. Some depenNash Q-learner with a minimax Q-learner need not dence on the policies of other agents is necessary, score well, but the minimax Q-learner will at least and to do this, some assumptions must be made learn a 'safe' strategy.
about how other agents will behave. One reasonable assumption is that past behavior is a strong indicator of future behavior. Q-learning, as 6.2. Nash Q-learning described earlier, implicitly uses this idea by choosing actions that maximize payoff as estimated by Nash Q-learning is a promising algorithm and has past interactions. It is also possible to model other been executed with positive results on some small, agents more directly, for example as probabilistic but interesting, environments. The results described stationary policies. Claus and Boutilier (1998) dein this paper, however, undercut its theoretical fined a joint-action Q-learning algorithm (JAL) that justifications. As detailed next, any situation in uses this idea to play team games, and Uther and which the use of Nash Q-learning is justified, Veloso (1997) used this approach in zero-sum games minimax Q-learning or team Q-learning would apto good effect. The fictitious play approach in game pear to be a more sensible choice.
theory, surveyed by Vrieze and Tijs (1982) , also Bowling (2000) pointed out that Nash Q-learning stems from this insight. Agent modeling would seem is only guaranteed to converge if the Q-functions at to be even more important in environments with every state either always has an adversarial equilibmore complex payoff structures. However, there is rium or always has a coordination equilibrium. As also some evidence that opponent modeling can be mentioned in Section 4, because of the possibility of problematic in some circumstances (Sun & Qi, games having both types of equilibria, the learner 2000). must know in advance which type of equilibrium to A drawback of straightforward agent modeling is pick in each state. If a state is of the 'adversarial' that it is purely reactive. In a sense, each agent is type, using minimax Q-learning (Section 4.2) gives a letting the other agents pick the equilibrium and then stronger guarantee than Nash Q-learning on the each learns a best response. It would be beneficial to amount of reward the agent will receive. If a state is identify a method that is partly opponent-indepenof the 'coordination' type, using team Q-learning dent, like Nash Q-learning, and partly opponent-(Section 5.2) results in learning the same values as sensitive, like Q-learning. The latter attribute could Nash Q-learning, but with a simpler computation.
encourage equilibrium behavior, so the actions Thus, even though Nash Q-learning can be applied chosen fit well with the actions chosen by other in very general settings, in any case in which its use agents. The former attribute could help encourage is formally justified -at present -minimax Qagents to select an equilibrium that results in high learning or team Q-learning is preferable. This payoff. The hope is that this could reduce the
